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J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)
I. INTRODUCTION
In J.E.B. v. Alabama,1 the United States Supreme Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges based solely on the gender of a potential juror. The Court
applied a heightened scrutiny test, the traditional equal protection
analysis prescribed for gender-based classifications, and concluded
that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror compe-
tence and impartiality."2 Determining that peremptory challenges ex-
ercised on the basis of gender stereotypes do not substantially further
the state's objective of securing a fair and impartial jury, the Court
established a procedure for addressing allegations of gender discrimi-
nation in jury selection.
This Note concludes that the Court correctly ruled that the con-
cept of equal protection of the laws is inconsistent with state-spon-
sored discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. This
Note first argues that the decision is a logical and predictable exten-
sion of prior case law. Next, it determines that men and women are
not fungible in the jury room, contrary to what the Court suggested,
but rather each contributes a unique perspective. This uniqueness,
however, does not translate into bias, and therefore, differences be-
tween the sexes cannot justify intentional exclusion of one gender or
the other from the jury panel. Finally, this Note analyzes the impact
of JE.B. v. Alabama upon future jury selection procedures and its im-
plications for criminal defendants being tried under the new peremp-
tory challenge rule.
1 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).




The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that "no State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."3 The development of equal protec-
tion jurisprudence within the context ofjury selection procedures has
spanned more than a century, yet its borders remain undefined and
subject to expansion.
A. EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that the government will
treat similar individuals similarly.4 Although the government may
classify people on the basis of group characteristics, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause mandates that these classifications relate in varying de-
grees to legitimate governmental purposes.5 To determine whether a
state law is discriminatory either on its face or in its application, the
Supreme Court developed a system of evaluating equal protection
claims according to one of three levels of scrutiny. The level of scru-
tiny triggered depends upon the characteristics of the group receiving
disparate treatment: rational basis review6 applies to issues involving
economic measures and classifications based on wealth and age;
7 strict
scrutiny8 applies to distinctions based on membership in a suspect
class such as race, national origin, or alienage;9 and an intermediate
3 U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV.
4 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. CL 2326, 2331 (1992).
5 Id.
6 The rational basis test asks whether a social or economic legislative classification ra-
tionally furthers a governmental objective that is not prohibited by the Constitution. Id.
7 See, e.g., id. (California property tax statute which created disparities in amount of
taxes paid by persons owning similar pieces of property did not violate Equal Protection
Clause because classification of taxpayers on basis of length of ownership rationally fur-
thered state interest in preserving neighborhood continuity and protecting owners' reli-
ance interests); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (statute charging
indigent families user fee for school bus service did not violate Equal Protection Clause
because it is within state's legitimate interest to encourage local school districts to provide
bus service without requiring districts to expend revenues); Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (Massachusetts statute requiring state police officers
to retire at age 50 was rationally related to legitimate state objective of protecting public by
assuring physical preparedness of officers. Therefore, statute did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
8 Classifications reviewed according to the strict scrutiny standard must be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental objective. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1976).
9 See, e.g., id. (Court reversed convictions of white man and African-American woman
who married in violation of Virginia antimiscegenation statute because no legitimate pur-
pose justified statutory classification according to race); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (state statutes which conditioned receipt of welfare benefits upon United States
citizenship or upon statutorily prescribed period of residence violated Equal Protection
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level of scrutiny applies to differentiation grounded in gender or
illegitimacy. 10,
The Court first recognized that gender classifications are subject
to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause in Reed v. Reed." Refin-
ing the scope of the Reed decision in subsequent cases, the Court
clearly articulated that men, as well as women, constitute a cognizable
group entitled to equal protection of the laws.' 2 The Court estab-
lished the intermediate scrutiny test, currently used to evaluate gen-
der-based classifications, in Craig v. Boren.a3 In Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan,14 the Court clarified this two-part test for determin-
ing whether a classification based on gender can withstand equal pro-
tection analysis: first, the classification drawn must serve important
governmental objectives, and second, the discriminatory means must
directly and substantially relate to the accomplishment of a legitimate
end.' 5
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The process of voir dire in a jury trial represents an attempt by
attorneys and the court to determine the suitability of prospective ju-
rors to serve on the jury during a particular litigation. Voir dire consists
of two different selection techniques: the challenge for cause and the
peremptory challenge. In exercising a challenge for cause, an attor-
ney must articulate a specific, demonstrable reason for believing that
the stricken juror will be unable to evaluate the facts of the case fairly
Clause because state desire to preserve welfare benefits for its own citizens or longtime
residents is not adequate justification for such discrimination).
10 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (statutory scheme which prohibited
sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 but allowed females 18 years or older to purchase
3.2% beer constituted invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation
of Equal Protection Clause); Lalli v. Lalli, 139 U.S. 259 (1978) (intestate succession statute
requiring illegitimate children, but not legitimate children, to provide proof of paternity
was not substantially related to permissible state interests and, therefore, violated Equal
Protection Clause).
11 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court found that while the Equal Protection Clause does
not deny states the power to legislate differential treatment for different classes of people,
the Constitution forbids the states from formulating classifications "on the basis of criteria
wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute." Id. at 75-76.
12 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 204; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
723 (1982) (policy of state-supported university limiting enrollment to female students vio-
lated Equal Protection Clause because State did not provide an exceedingly persuasive
justification for exclusion of males).
13 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
14 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
15 Id. at 724-25. The Court reasoned that "[t] he purpose of requiring that close rela-
tionship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate
assumptions about the proper roles of men and women." Id. at 72-26.
1030 [Vol. 85
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
and impartially.' 6 Peremptory challenges, on the other hand, permit
rejection of ajuror "for a real or imagined partiality" and may be exer-
cised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being sub-
ject to the court's control."'
7
The peremptory challenge is an ancient institution that
originated in thirteenth-century England.'8 Imported to the Ameri-
can colonies, it evolved into an important device for protecting the
right of an accused to receive a trial by a fair and impartial tribunal.19
Although the Constitution does not guarantee litigants a right to exer-
cise peremptory challenges, each litigant's ability to strike arbitrarily a
limited number ofjurors has been codified by statutes and case law to
assure an unbiased jury selection. 20 In practice, peremptory chal-
lenges are exercised upon intuition and first impressions and "on
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official
action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affilia-
tions of people summoned for jury duty."
2'
C. RACE AND JURY SELECrION
The Supreme Court first interpreted the impact of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause on jury selection procedures in the landmark case
Strauder v. West Virginia,22 in which the Court overturned the murder
conviction of an African-American man tried by an all-white jury and
declared unconstitutional a West Virginia statute that rendered Afri-
can-Americans ineligible for jury service. Justice Strong, writing for
the Court, declared that laws completely excluding African-American
persons from the jury venire, "so that by no possibility can any colored
man sit upon the jury," violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.23 Framing its argument as a rhetorical in-
quiry, the Court asked of what significance is the language of the
Equal Protection Clause if not to declare that:
the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that
all persons, whether colored or white shall stand equal before the laws of
the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the
amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be
16 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
17 Id.
18 Patrickj. Guinee, Comment, The Trend Toward the Extension of Batson to Gender-based
Peremptory Challenges, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 833 (1994).
19 See David Everett Marko, The Case Against Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 4 HAS-
TNGS WoMEN's LJ. 109, 110-11 (1993).
20 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
21 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
22 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
23 Id. at 305.
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made against them by law because of their color?24
Every criminal defendant is entitled to trial by a jury drawn from a
venire that has been selected in a manner completely devoid of race-
based discrimination. 25 While the decision in Strauder represented a
significant step forward for newly emancipated African-American
males, the Court stopped short of extending to all persons the equal
protection of the laws-it conspicuously shunned women of all races
condoning their exclusion from participation in the administration of
justice.26 It was not until nearly a century later that the Court recog-
nized that "the exclusion of women from jury venires deprives a crimi-
nal defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial
jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community."
27
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits race-based peremptory challenges
in the 1965 case Swain v. Alabama.28 The petitioner, an African-Ameri-
can man convicted of rape and sentenced to death by an all-white jury,
alleged that African-Americans were systematically under-represented
on juries in his jurisdiction and that the prosecutor had peremptorily
eliminated all potential African-American jurors at the petitioner's
trial in violation of the Constitution.29 Although the Court acknowl-
edged that complete exclusion of members of a particular race from
jury service violates the Constitution, it noted that the defendant had
the burden of proving that a prosecutor has demonstrated a pattern
of striking qualified African-American jurors with the result that no
African-American persons are ever allowed to serve on juries.30 Rec-
ognizing that the peremptory challenge safeguards the right of the
accused to a fair trial and is a capricious device exercised on the basis
of minimal knowledge about each juror, the Court held that a prose-
cutor's act of striking African-American veniremen in one isolated
case does not constitute a violation of equal protection.3 '
Twenty-one years later, in Batson v. Kentucky,32 the Court rejected
the evidentiary burden that the Court in Swain prescribed and instead
ruled that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence con-
cerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at defend-
24 Id. at 307.
25 Id. at 309.
26 See id. at 310.
27 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535-36 (1975).
28 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
29 Id. at 205.
30 Id. at 223.
32 Id. at 221.
32 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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ant's trial."33 The Court added that since the Court's decision in
Strauder, states no longer have laws that facially discriminate against
minorityjurors.3 4 Therefore, it is important to scrutinize the manner
in which state officers, such as criminal prosecutors, administer stat-
utes defining juror qualifications.5 Justice Powell, writing for the ma-
jority,3 6 stated that to establish a prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination in the administration of peremptory challenges, de-
fendants: (1) must demonstrate that they are a member of a cogniza-
ble racial group and that the state has used peremptory challenges to
strike potential jurors of the defendant's own race; (2) may rely on the
fact that the use of peremptory challenges injury selection allows dis-
crimination to occur; and (3) must show that the facts raise an infer-
ence that the prosecutor excluded potential jurors solely because of
their race.3 7 Once a defendant makes the requisite showing, the bur-
den shifts to the state to provide race-neutral explanations for chal-
lenges exercised against African-American jurors.3 8 While the
explanation need not be as precise and well-reasoned as a challenge
for cause, prosecutors may not justify their challenges on the simple
assumption that members of the defendant's race would be biased in
favor of the defendant.3 9
Chief Justice Burger authored a prophetic dissent in Batsono
which noted that the majority opinion did not apply conventional
equal protection analysis, and therefore, limited the application of the
decision to allegations of racial discrimination. He predicted that
under conventional equal protection principles, the floodgates would
open and exclusions on the basis of gender, religion, mental capacity,
occupation, political inclination, family size, and living arrangements
would be called into question.41 Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger
prophesied that the prohibitions levied against the state prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges would inevitably apply to defendants as
well.4
2
Recently, the Court elaborated on the principles of Batson and
expanded the circumstances under which the exercise of peremptory
33 Id. at 96.
34 Id. at 88.
35 Id.
36 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joined the
opinion.
37 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
38 Id. at 97.
39 Id.
40 ChiefJustice Rehnquistjoined in the opinion.
41 Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 125-26 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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challenges constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
First, the Court recognized that a criminal defendant has standing to
assert the third-party rights of individual jurors excluded from a jury
on the basis of race because the defendant and the excluded jurors
share a common interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial
process.43 The practical implication of this decision is that "a criminal
defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected
through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the
excluded jurors share the same race."44 Second, the Court erased the
distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in the context of
an Equal Protection Clause challenge by declaring that it is unconsti-
tutional for private civil litigants, as well as state criminal prosecutors,
to exclude jurors on the basis of race.45 Determining that private civil
litigants behave as state actors subject to the restraints of the Equal
Protection Clause when they exercise peremptory challenges 46 and
that civil litigants may assert the excluded juror's equal protection
rights at trial,47 the Court stated that "[r]acial discrimination has no
43 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411-15 (1991).
44 Id. at 402. In Powers, a white defendant objected to the removal of seven African-
American venirepersons from the jury through the use of peremptory challenges. Id. at
401-02. The Court found that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause had indeed oc-
curred, declaring that "to bar petitioner's claim because his race differs from that of the
excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty,
honor, and privilege ofjury service." Id. at 415. The Court claimed that its holding was
not inconsistent with the principles articulated in Batson because "racial identity between
the defendant and the excused person might in some cases be the explanation for the
prosecution's adoption of the forbidden stereotype, and ... it may provide one of the
easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a conclusive showing that wrongful
discrimination has occurred." Id. at 416.
45 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991). In Edmonson, an
African-American construction worker, who sued his former employer for negligence re-
lated to a worksite injury, objected to the defendant employer's use of two of its three
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire jurors of the plaintiff's race. Id.
46 The Court reached this conclusion by applying a two-part test articulated in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620. According to that test,
the conduct of private parties constitutes state action governed by the Constitution when
an alleged constitutional violation occurred as a result of the exercise of a right derived
from state authority and the private party who allegedly engaged in the violation could be
described in all fairness as a state actor. Id. Claiming that the first prong of the test was
satisfied, the Court stated that although not constitutionally mandated, the use of peremp-
tory challenges is authorized by statute and decisional law solely to "permit litigants to
assist the government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact." Id. The second part of
the test was satisfied, because the jury is a governmental body, the selection of jurors is a
governmental function which is delegated to private litigants, and the exercise of the deci-
sionmaking power is supervised and controlled by the court. Id. at 621-28. Furthermore,
the fact that jury selection takes place in a courthouse, which symbolizes government au-
thority, gives the appearance that the process is government-sanctioned. Id. at 628.
47 The Court determined that the three requirements for third-party standing as set
forth in Powers were satisfied in this case even though the participants were civil, not crimi-
nal, litigants: (1) persons excluded from the jury are equally unable to protect their own
[Vol. 851034
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place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal."48
Third, the Court held that a criminal defendant's exercise of racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection
Clause because the harm caused to the personal dignity of the ex-
cluded juror and to the integrity of the judicial system is the same
regardless of which side effected the juror's dismissal.49 Expanding
the scope of its recent precedents, the Court determined that criminal
defendants engage in state action when they participate injury selec-
tion,50 and state prosecutors have standing to assert the third-party
rights of the excluded jurors.51
D. GENDER AND JURY SELECrION
A woman's right to serve on a jury has evolved more slowly than
the reciprocal right among racial minorities. Furthermore, the devel-
opment of this right initially progressed along the lines of the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section guarantee rather than according to the
principles of equal protection.
1. Sixth Amendment "Fair Cross-Section" Analysis
In Ballard v. United States,52 the first case to recognize that women
rights regardless of whether the trial is a criminal or civil proceeding; (2) the process of
voir dire in both civil and criminal settings allows a litigant to develop a relationship with
thejurors that persists throughout the duration of the trial; and (3) the civil litigant suffers
the same type of cognizable injury as does the criminal defendant because discrimination
in the jury selection process generates severe doubt about the fairness and integrity of the
judicial process as a whole. Id. at 629-30.
48 Id. at 630.
49 See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353 (1992). The state prosecutor in this
case attempted to obtain an order from the trial court that would require the defendants,
two white men on trial for a racially-motivated attack on an African-American man and
woman, to provide race-neutral explanations for the exercise of their peremptory chal-
lenges if the state made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination against the defend-
ants. Id. at 2351-52.
50 Id. at 2354-57. Applying the same pattern of reasoning articulated in Edmonson v.
Lesifle Concrete Co., the Court concluded that state action encompasses a criminal defend-
ant's exercise of peremptory challenges. The Court found that the conclusions reached in
Edmonson with respect to civil litigants "apply with even greater force in the criminal con-
text because the selection of ajury in a criminal case fulfills a unique and constitutionally
compelled governmental function." Id. at 2355.
51 Id. at 2357. The Court arrived at this conclusion by applying the three-prong stand-
ing test set forth in Powers v. Ohio. First the Court determined that a state suffers cogniza-
ble injury when the fairness and integrity of its own judicial system is compromised by
procedural discrimination on the basis of race. Id. Second, it is logical for a state to assert
the equal protection rights of discriminatorily dismissed jurors because the state functions
as a representative of all of its own citizens. Id. Finally, excluded jurors experience the
same degree of difficulty bringing suit on their own behalf regardless of whether the trial
takes place in a civil or criminal court. Id.
52 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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comprise an integral part of the community from which jurors are
selected, the Court exercised its power of supervision over the federal
courts by reversing the indictments and convictions of two criminal
defendants based on the systematic exclusion of women from partici-
pation on the grand jury and petit jury.53 The Court found that
"[t]he systematic and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclu-
sion of a racial group or an economic or social class, deprives the jury
system of the broad base it was designed by Congress to have in our
democratic society." 54 While acknowledging that a federal juror's
competence depends on the character of the individual rather than
group or class membership, the Court admitted that male and female
jurors are not fungible.55 Members of each gender bring a different
perspective to jury deliberations, and while neither males nor females
act as a class in rendering a verdict, the complete exclusion of one sex
diminishes the possibility that a defendant will receive ajury selected
from a fair cross-section of the community.56 The Court recognized
that the injury from barring women from jury service extends beyond
the individual defendant and causes harm "to the jury system, to the
law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic
ideal reflected in the processes of our courts."
57
In 1975, the Court examined the conviction of a criminal defend-
ant whose jury had been composed according to provisions in the
Louisiana Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure that pre-
vented any woman from being summoned for jury duty unless she had
previously registered a request with a court clerk to participate in the
judicial process. 58 While the statute did not completely disqualify wo-
men from jury service, the practical effect of the law was to create a
gross disparity in the number of men and women summoned for jury
service in Louisiana. 59 The Court held that a statute that operates to
exclude women from jury service does not comport with the fair cross-
53 Id. at 189-90.
54 Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
55 Id. at 193.
56 Id. at 193-94.
57 Id. at 195.
58 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 523 (1975). The pertinent section of the Louisi-
ana Constitution read:
[t]he Legislature shall provide for the election and drawing of competent and intelli-
gentjurors for the trial of civil and criminal cases; provided, however, that no woman
shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the clerk of
the District Court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to such service.
Ix CONST. art. VII, § 41 (repealed 1974). The relevant criminal code sections stated: "[a]
woman shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of
[the] court of the parish in which she resides a written declaration of her desire to be
subject to jury service." LA. CODE CiuM. PRoc. ANN. art. 402 (repealed 1974).
59 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525.
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section guarantee of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution,6° because the exclusion from the jury pool of a large identifi-
able class of citizens defeats the protectionary aim of that
requirement.61 Men and women each bring distinct qualities to the
jury box. Therefore, the systematic elimination of either sex from jury
panels deprives criminal defendants of their constitutionally guaran-
teed right to trial by a fair and impartial cross-section of the commu-
nity.62 The Court carefully emphasized the fact that although the
petit jury must derive from a representative cross-section of the com-
munity, "defendants are not entitled to ajury of any particular compo-
sition," and the decision imposes "no requirement that petit juries
actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various
and distinctive groups in the population."
63
2. Equal Protection Analysis: The Circuit Split
The federal Courts of Appeals which considered the issue of gen-
der-based peremptory challenges prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion injE.B. v. Alabama, split on the question of whether such strikes
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of
the laws.
In United States v. Hamilton,65 the Fourth Circuit, while expressing
distaste for the elimination of jurors based on group classifications,
refused to extend the Batson prohibition against race-based peremp-
tory challenges to gender.66 The Court upheld a prosecutor's exer-
cise of three peremptory strikes against African-American female
venirepersons, reasoning that if the Supreme Court in Batson had in-
tended to eliminate peremptory challenges based on gender, it would
have declared all challenges based on group characteristics to be viola-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause. 67 Although the Equal Protec-
tion Clause forbids gender discrimination in other contexts, the
Batson decision gives no indication that traditional equal protection
analysis applies to the unique realm of peremptory challenges.68
60 The relevant portion of the Sixth Amendment reads: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...." U.S. CoNsr. amend.
VI.
61 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31.
62 Id. at 531.
63 Id. at 538.
64 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
65 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988).





The Fifth Circuit concurred with the Fourth Circuit, declaring
that courts must confine the Batson decision to the context of race,
because women do not face the same types of barriers to jury service
that African-Americans experience. 69 Hypothesizing that the Court's
formulation in Swain of a pattern of inequality across cases is sufficient
to address concerns about gender discrimination, the Fifth Circuit
pointed out that women are not a statistical minority, and therefore, it
would be nearly impossible to remove all female jurors in a particular
case through the use of peremptory challenges.
70
The Ninth Circuit developed a different view of the issue, holding
that a female criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges to
strike male jurors from the venire violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 71 After establishing that the prosecution had standing to ob-
ject to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges, the Ninth Cir-
cuit engaged in traditional equal protection analysis, applying the
heightened scrutiny test prescribed for gender classifications. 72 While
gender discrimination is tolerated if it is "substantially related to the
achievement of important governmental objectives," peremptory chal-
lenges based solely on the gender of the prospective juror do not fur-
ther the important government objective of securing a fair and
impartial jury.78 Therefore, because removal ofjurors in this manner
is unrelated to the person's ability to be impartial, such peremptory
challenges are invalid.74 The Ninth Circuit concluded that criminal
defendants are state actors when they exercise peremptory challenges
at their own trials, noting that the jury is a governmental body and its
selection is supervised and controlled by the court, a state agency.75
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 21 October 1991, a civil paternity suit filed by the State of
Alabama on behalf of Teresia Bible against the petitioner, Jim Bow-
man, was called to trial in the District Court of Jackson County, Ala-
bama.76 Based on a struck jury method specified in the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure, 77 the court empaneled ajury consisting ex-
69 See United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1993).
70 Id.
71 See United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992).
72 Id. at 1436-39.
73 Id. at 1439.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1440-41.
76 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (No.
92-1239).
77 A struckjury is chosen by allowing the litigants to take turns strikingjurors from the
panel until the requisite number ofjurors remain.
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clusively of female jurors. Beginning with a venire of twenty-four wo-
men and twelve men, the trial court excused one woman and two men
for cause and allowed the litigants to alternate in the exercise of per-
emptory strikes against twenty-one of the remaining thirty-three pro-
spective jurors.78 The State exercised all but one of its peremptory
strikes to remove nine men from the jury pool, while counsel for Bow-
man eliminated ten women and one man from the venire.7
9
Before the Court empaneled the jury, Bowman objected to the
State's removal of male jurors solely on the basis of their gender, and
requested a hearing in accordance with procedures articulated by the
Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky 8° to determine whether the State
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by exercising its peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner.
81
Bowman claimed that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Batson, which
determined that peremptory strikes based solely on the race of the
potential juror are unconstitutional, applied with equal force to inten-
tional gender discrimination in the jury selection process.82 Thus,
Bowman argued, gender-based peremptory strikes were similarly pro-
hibited.83 The trial court overruled Bowman's objection and denied
his request for a hearing, explaining that the original venire of sixty-
two persons had been cut in half by disregarding every other name on
the list.84 As a result, the three to one ratio of women to men in the
thirty-six-member jury pool occurred randomly.85 At the conclusion
of the trial, the all-female jury held that Bowman was the father of
Teresia Bible's child.86 In response to the jury's findings, the court
ordered Bowman to pay child support to Bible in the amount of
$415.71 per month.
87
The trial court denied Bowman's postjudgment motion request-
ing an order ofjudgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alter-
native a new trial, stating that the Batson prohibition against racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges does not apply to gender-moti-
vated peremptory strikes.88 In January 1992, Bowman appealed the
case to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals claiming that the lower
78 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 2,J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (No.
92-1239).
79 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421-22 (1994).
80 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
81 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2,J.E.B. (No. 92-1239).
82 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
83 Id.
84 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239).
85 Id.
86 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
87 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239).
88 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4-5, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239).
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court committed error by denying Bowman's request for a hearing to
determine whether the State's use of gender-based peremptory strikes
during jury selection violated his right to equal protection of the
laws.89 The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
and denied Bowman's petition for rehearing, citing Alabama
Supreme Court precedent that refused to extend the Batson principle
to gender-based strikes.90 On 23 October 1992, the Alabama Supreme
Court denied Bowman's subsequent writ of certiorari to the Court of
Civil Appeals.91 Following this denial, Bowman filed a petition for cer-
tiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on 17 May 1993 to determine whether the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the exercise of peremptory challenges to
eliminate prospective jurors on the basis of gender.
92
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Alabama Court
of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for proceedings consistent
with the Court's holding that gender-based peremptory challenges vi-
olate the Equal Protection Clause.93 Justice Blackmun, delivering the
opinion of the Court,94 declared that "today we reaffirm what, by now,
should be axiomatic: intentional discrimination on the basis of gen-
der by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly
where, as here, the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate in-
vidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities
of men and women."95 Justice Blackmun began his opinion with a
thorough discussion of precedent relating to gender and jury service.
In the next segment of the opinion, he conducted an equal protec-
tion analysis of the facts of the case, applying a heightened scrutiny
standard of review. Finally, Justice Blackmun addressed the conse-
quences and implications of the Court's opinion.
Justice Blackmun laid the foundation for his legal analysis of the
case by discussing at length the history of women's jury service in the
United States.96 Recognizing that the issue of discrimination on the
basis of gender in the jury selection process is a fairly recent develop-
89 Id. at 5.
90 J.E.B. v. State, 606 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
91 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 5, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239).
92 J.E.B. v. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
93 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
94 Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburgjoined in the opinion.
95 JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
96 See id. at 1422.
1040 [Vol. 85
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
ment, Justice Blackmun explained the phenomenon by recounting
the fact that women were completely excluded from jury service until
the nineteenth century and continued to be excluded by many states
even after women attained suffrage in 1920.9 7 Justice Blackmun cited
several cases 98 which justified the exclusion of women by articulating a
need to protect the delicacy of the female gender from the depravity
and corrosive effects of the courtroom.9 9 Discussing the 1946 case,
Ballard v. United States,100 in which the Court held that women could
not be excluded from federal juries where the local laws provided that
women were eligible for jury service, Justice Blackmun quoted a pas-
sage that recognized that while neither men nor women act as a class
when sitting as jurors, male and female jurors are not interchangea-
ble-each influences the other to create a unique courtroom atmos-
phere which cannot be replicated in the absence of one gender or the
other. 01
Justice Blackmun concluded his overview of gender and jury se-
lection with a discussion of Taylor v. Louisiana,0 2 the 1975 Supreme
Court case that struck down a state statute restricting the ability of
women to serve on juries.103 In that case, the Court reasoned that
restricting jury service to certain segments of the population violated
the Sixth Amendment because juries must consist of a fair cross-sec-
tion of the community to assure their impartiality. 0 4
Turning his attention to the equal protection issues in the case,
Justice Blackmun outlined the developments that have occurred in
the area of gender discrimination. 0 5 The Court noted that the
United States has a long history of sex discrimination, and that fact
alone warrants the application of a heightened scrutiny to all gender-
based classifications to distinguish governmental policies based on
reasonable assumptions from those based on gender stereotypes and
misconceptions. 0 6 The Court rejected the State's argument that be-
cause gender discrimination in the United States has not reached the
same level of severity as race discrimination, courts should allow gen-
der-based peremptory challenges, even though they prohibit race-
97 Id. at 1422-23.
98 Bradwell v. State, 21 L. Ed. 442 (1872); Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424 (Ark. 1949); In
re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875).
99 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423.
100 329 U.S. 187.
101 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424 (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94).
102 419 U.S. 522.
103 SeeJ.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1424-25.
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based challenges.'0 7 The Court stated that although differences may
exist in the histories of their oppression, both African-Americans and
women share the experience of being excluded from juries. 08 Fur-
thermore, attempts to calculate which group has suffered greater in-
jury are irrelevant.'0 9
The Court stated that the only inquiry necessary to determine
whether the gender-based peremptory strike survives heightened scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the discriminatory
act furthers a legitimate state interest in "achieving a fair and impar-
tial trial."110 In making this determination, Justice Blackmun refused
to engage in a cost-benefit analysis pitting the institutional value of the
peremptory challenge against the desire to eliminate the specter of
discrimination from the legal process."' Instead, the Court restricted
the scope of its review to consideration of "whether peremptory chal-
lenges based on gender stereotypes provide substantial aid to a liti-
gant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury.""
12
The majority held that the State failed to demonstrate that elimi-
nating male jurors from the venire would facilitate the process of ob-
taining an impartial jury.113 Justice Blackmun, rejecting the State's
rationale that male jurors might identify and sympathize with the male
defendant in the case to the detriment of the out-of-wedlock child and
the state, emphasized the fact that " [t] he State's interest in every trial
is to see that the proceedings are carried out in a fair, impartial, and
nondiscriminatory manner."" 4 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun ob-
served that the justifications offered by the State for its gender-based
peremptory challenges are grounded upon the same types of gender
stereotypes that were used to justify the exclusion of women from ju-
ries in the past, and the State offered no evidence that such assump-
tions are correlated with or predictive of actual juror attitudes.' 1 5
After concluding that allowing litigants to exercise gender-based
peremptory strikes serves no legitimate state interest, the majority bol-
stered its decision by examining the detrimental results of permitting
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges." 6 First, the Court
opined that litigants are harmed by the risk that the bias exhibited




111 Id. at 1425-26.
112 Id. at 1426.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1426 n.8.
115 Id. at 1426-27.
116 Id. at 1427.
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during jury selection will manifest itself during the trial proceeding as
well. 1 7 Second, the Court believed that the community would suffer
injury as a result of "the State's participation in the perpetuation of
invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in
our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the court-
room engenders."118 Finally, the Court recognized that excluded ju-
rors are stripped of their dignity, reminded, in the case of female
jurors, of their history of exclusion, and branded as unqualified to
participate in a process to which all persons have a right to contrib-
ute." 9 While the majority acknowledged the argument that all per-
emptory challenges are based on some sort of stereotype, it
differentiated peremptory challenges based on characteristics other
than race or gender by the fact that those types of challenges do not
threaten injury to fundamental personal dignity and do not recall a
history of exclusion based on stereotypical notions.
20
Attempting to assuage fears that its decision would ultimately lead
to the effective elimination of peremptory challenges from the jury
selection process, the Court delineated several instances in which the
peremptory challenge may be constitutionally exercised without rely-
ing on stereotypical assumptions about gender and race.' 2 ' As long as
gender does not serve as a proxy for bias, litigants may continue to
strike jurors from the panel, including jurors who are members of any
class subject to "rational basis" review under the Equal Protection
Clause and jurors who exhibit characteristics that are over repre-
sented in one gender. 122 The Court noted that the voir dire process
can adequately acquaint litigants with juror attitudes and eliminate
the need to rely on race or gender stereotypes.'
23
Finally, the Court outlined the procedure according to which liti-
gants must address future allegations of gender discrimination in the
use of peremptory challenges.' 24 First, as the Batson decision man-
dated for race-based claims, the objecting party must make a prima
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1428.
120 Id. n.14.
121 Id. at 1429.
122 Id. The Court describes two examples of constitutional peremptory strikes based on
characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one gender. First, a peremptory
challenge of all persons that have military experience likely affects men more than women
at this time. Second, a challenge of all persons employed as nurses has the opposite result
of affecting more women than men. Absent a showing of pretext, such challenges may not





facie showing of intentional discrimination. 12 5 The challenged party
must then describe to the court the basis for striking the juror in ques-
tion. 12 6 To adequately justify a peremptory strike, the challenged
party need only identify a characteristic other than gender as the basis
of the strike and demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the expla-
nation is not merely a pretext for striking jurors of a particular gen-
der. 2 7 While requiring a litigant to articulate the reasons for
exercising a suspect peremptory challenge places a greater burden on
the litigants, the Court pointed out that such explanations need not
meet the stringent requirement of a "for cause" challenge.'
28
In concluding that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional
proxy for juror competence and impartiality,"' 2 9 the majority ad-
dressed its concern that "when persons are excluded from participa-
tion in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender,
[the] promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system
is jeopardized."13 0 The Court believed that its decision not only pro-
moted gender equality but also prevented racial discrimination from
occurring free from judicial scrutiny, under the guise of gender bias,
in contravention of the principles set forth in Batson.'
31
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor joined the majority holding that the exclusion
of persons from jury service on the basis of gender violates the Equal
Protection Clause, but she delivered a cautionary concurring opinion
that the majority's decision further eroded the role of the peremptory
challenge injury trials. Justice O'Connor predicted that by eliminat-
ing gender-based peremptory challenges, the Court "increases the
number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-will be-
come part of the main event."' 32 For that reason, Justice O'Connor
argued, the Court's decision minimizes the ability of the peremptory
challenge to maintain its long-cherished role as an aid to obtaining
fair and impartial juries.1
3 3
Justice O'Connor hypothesized that this decision will jeopardize
the right of private litigants to a fair and impartial trial, because law-
yers will no longer be able to rely on inarticulable intuition to deter-
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1430.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1421.
130 Id. at 1430.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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mine which jurors hold a particular disposition.TM Therefore, lawyers
will be more reluctant to exercise peremptory challenges against ju-
rors that they instinctively suspect are biased because of fear that they
will have to provide a gender-neutral explanation for the strike. 135 As
litigators become paralyzed by the uncertainty of the situation, the
possibility of biasedjurors being admitted to the jury will increase.' 36
Justice O'Connor also expressed her conviction that the prohibi-
tion against the use of gender-based peremptory challenges should
apply only to government actors-i.e., prosecutors or attorneys for the
government in civil cases. While acknowledging that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause forbids the use of discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges in this case, where the challenged litigant is undeniably a state
actor, Justice O'Connor adamantly declared that private litigants, in
particular criminal defendants, are not state actors and should not,
therefore, be subject to the constitutional prohibition against gender
discrimination. 137 She lamented the fact that in recent years the
Court has rendered imprudent decisions' 38 establishing the principle
that all litigants are state actors when exercising peremptory chal-
lenges.' 3 9 Contemporary trends restricting private litigants' use of
peremptory challenges threaten to extinguish "one of the most impor-
tant of the rights secured to the accused." 14°
Justice O'Connor stated that the peremptory challenge is both a
fundamental aspect of securing an impartial jury and a valuable tool
for litigators, and, therefore, she hesitated to embrace the new restric-
tions on its discretionary power.' 41 Contrary to the majority view, Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that the usefulness of the peremptory
challenge to litigants is not lessened by gender discrimination in the
134 Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136 Id. (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
137 Id. at 1432 (O'Cnnor, J., concurring).
138 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991).
139 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Scalia similarly expressed his disagreement with the Court's previous decisions estab-
lishing that both civil litigants and criminal defendants are state actors when they exercise
peremptory challenges. Id. at 1437 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, he challenged
Justice O'Connor's implication that reversing such precedent is harmonious with prohibit-
ing only government actors from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia speculated that if substantive differences actually
exist between the attitudes of male and female jurors, allowing criminal defendants to
strike jurors on the basis of gender, but refusing to allow prosecutors the same latitude will
generate the undesirable outcome of skewing the jury system in the defendants' favor. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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exercise of such strikes. 142 While the majority held that the fact that
jurors' attitudes may differ according to gender is legally irrelevant,
Justice O'Connor reasoned that "to say that gender makes no differ-
ence as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no difference as
a matter of fact."143 She stated that "gender matters" because jurors
cannot separate themselves from their experiences as men and wo-
men when they step into the jury box. 44
C. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority's conclusion that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits gender discrimination in the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges. 145 However, he wrote a separate con-
curring opinion to trace the developments in equal protection
jurisprudence which he felt compelled the majority's decision.
146
Justice Kennedy recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment was
originally enacted and judicially interpreted as a prohibition against
racial discrimination by government actors. 147 Pointing to early
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause,
148
Justice Kennedy noted that while the Court held that state laws that
intentionally excluded African-Americans from jury service violated
the Equal Protection Clause, the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not extend to women in any context until many years
later.149 Beginning in 1971, the Court acknowledged that the prohibi-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause extend beyond racial discrimina-
tion to include discrimination on the basis of gender, and thus,
government classifications based on sex must survive heightened scru-
tiny by the judiciary to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. 150 While
Supreme Court precedents clearly established that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause prohibits gender discrimination in the selection of a jury
pool,151 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the issue of whether per-
emptory challenges based on gender are similarly unconstitutional re-
mained undecided until the present time.
152
142 Id. at 1431-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 1433 (Kennedy" J., concurring).
146 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
147 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
148 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880).
149 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
152 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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After setting the historical stage, Justice Kennedy concluded that
denying individuals the right to serve on a jury by exercising a per-
emptory strike against them on the basis of gender is no less injurious
to the individual than laws that blatantly prohibit jury service by indi-
viduals of one gender or the other.'53 Justice Kennedy arrived at this
conclusion by examining the neutral language in which the Equal
Protection Clause frames its guarantees: the fact that the Clause ex-
tends its protections to "any person," he concluded, indicates that the
framers intended to afford equal treatment to each individual, not
merely to each class of individuals.154 Therefore, striking individuals
from ajury because of their gender causes injury to "personal dignity
and the individual's right to participate in the political process." 155
The individual rights component of the Equal Protection Clause is
significant to Justice Kennedy, who recognized that it is the jurors'
duty to formulate a judgment on the basis of their individual assess-
ment of the facts, not on the basis of racial or gender group bias.156
He concluded that assumptions on the part of society that a person
belonging to a particular race or gender classification will act as a rep-
resentative of that group and interject bias into jury deliberations in-
sults the integrity of individual jurors and denigrates the entire jury
system.157
D. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
even though the Court may have decided Batson v. Kentucky'
58 cor-
rectly, the majority erred in extending the Batson prohibition against
race-based peremptory challenges to strikes made on the basis of gen-
der, because the Court has recognized significant differences between
race and gender discrimination in its equal protection jurispru-
dence. 59 That the Court in Batson recognized a difference between
the two types of discrimination is apparent from the fact that "classifi-
153 Id. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring). Justice Kennedy viewed the fact that the majority con-
sidered the exclusion of male jurors to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause as
reinforcement of his notions about the neutrality of the Fourteenth Amendment.
156 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring). Justice Kennedy conceived of thejury system as a com-
pact according to which thejudge transfers the power to decide a case to the jury and the
jury agrees to abide by certain instructions "defining the relevant issues for consideration."
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Anyjuror who allows racial or gender bias to creep into the
deliberation process in effect breaches the compact and violates the oath. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
157 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
159 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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cations based on race are inherently suspect" and entitled to "strict
scrutiny" by the Court, but gender classifications are assessed accord-
ing to a less stringent standard of review.160 Justice Rehnquist opined
that racial groups require a greater degree of protection because they,
unlike either gender, constitute statistical minorities in the United
States and have experienced greater difficulty than women in ob-
taining equal treatment. 161
Turning to a discussion of Batson, Justice Rehnquist argued that
although the Court in Batson concluded that the prohibitions against
racial discrimination contained in the Equal Protection Clause out-
weigh deference to the historical practice of using peremptory chal-
lenges, it did not intend to diminish the capacity of the peremptory
challenge to secure fairness and impartiality in the jury system.' 62 The
differences between racial and gender classifications combined with
the Batson Court's reluctance to erode the usefulness of the peremp-
tory challenge therefore dictate that gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges should withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. 163 Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the State of Alabama failed to provide sufficient evidence that
striking jurors on the basis of gender furthers a legitimate state inter-
est in securing a fair and impartial jury. 64 He asserted that men and
women differ not only biologically, but also in terms of experience,
and that "[i] t is not merely 'stereotyping' to say that these differences
may produce a difference in outlook which is brought into the jury
room."' 65 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist concluded, basing peremp-
tory challenges on the gender of the juror is "generally not the sort of
derogatory and invidious act which peremptory challenges directed at
black jurors may be."166
E. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Referring to the issue in the case as "sex discrimination" because
of the cultural and attitudinal baggage which he believes accompanies
the term "gender,"167 Justice Scalia' 68 authored a sarcastic dissenting
opinion in which he proclaimed that most of the majority's discussion
160 Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
161 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
162 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
163 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
166 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 1436 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in the opinion.
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of the case was "irrelevant."169 Justice Scalia labeled Justice Black-
mun's discussion of the historical exclusion of women from jury ser-
vice as irrelevant because the issue in this case focused on
discrimination against men rather than women. 7 0 Equally irrelevant,
Justice Scalia stated, is the Court's discussion of the lack of evidence
supporting the State of Alabama's assertion that relying on gender
stereotypes accurately predicts the views and dispositions of potential
jurors.
1 7 2
Justice Scalia launched his assault against Justice Blackmun and
the majority by decrying the Court's illogical remedy of awarding a
new trial to a petitioner who suffered no injury in the original tria1 7 2
Justice Scalia reasoned that, by the majority's own logic, male and fe-
male jurors are "fungible," and therefore, since the outcome would
presumably have been the same if male jurors had been sitting on the
jury, their exclusion harmed only the stricken jurors. 73 Justice Scalia
conceded that the petitioner's cause of action rested upon Supreme
Court precedent 74 granting third-party standing in cases where a
stricken juror has been injured, but denounced such a practice, claim-
ing that this case illustrates why it is illogical to afford a remedy to the
litigant when it is the excluded juror who has been wronged. 175 Since
scientific evidence presented at trial established the petitioner's pater-
nity with 99.92% accuracy, granting the petitioner a retrial will need-
lessly consume State resources to rectify a truly harmless error. 76
Justice Scalia next attacked the majority's equal protection analy-
sis by accusing the Court of failing to see the big picture. Focusing
upon individual exercises of the peremptory challenge, the Court con-
cluded that exercising a peremptory challenge on the basis of a group
characteristic subject to heightened scrutiny violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 177 However, Justice Scalia argued that because all groups
are regularly subject to the peremptory challenge and each will occa-
sionally become the target of such strikes, no single group exper-
iences differential treatment.178 Justice Scalia cited the present case as
a perfect example of the even-handedness of the peremptory chal-
lenge system: each side in the dispute attempted to remove jurors of
169 J.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 1436-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
'75 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
177 Id. at 1422.
178 Id. at 1437 (ScAlia, J., dissenting).
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one gender from the jury panel in an effort, not to express disdain for
the capabilities of that gender, but to secure a jury that would favor
the litigant's case.
179
Justice Scalia then took issue with the majority's application of
the "heightened scrutiny" test which requires any instance of gender-
based discrimination to substantially further an important state inter-
est to survive an Equal Protection Clause challenge. 180 The majority
concluded that the only plausible state interest that the exercise of
peremptory challenges could affect, the selection of a fair and impar-
tial jury, was not furthered by the use of gender-based strikes.' 8 '
Although the State of Alabama claimed that it aimed its strikes at re-
moving a group that might unduly favor male defendants, the Court
refused to accept any justifications based on unconstitutional stereo-
types.182 Justice Scalia interpreted the Court's conclusion as an elimi-
nation of all possible arguments in support of gender-based strikes,
implying that gender-based peremptory challenges are not capable of
satisfying even a rational basis test, much less heightened scrutiny. 1
83
From this, he extrapolated that the majority's decision endangers all
peremptory challenges based on group characteristics because it is
possible to claim that any such strike is based on a stereotype.
184
Focusing his attention on the consequences of extending the
Court's decision in Batson to gender and possibly other classifications,
Justice Scalia described the damage inflicted by the majority's deci-
sion.' 85 First, he noted that forcing a litigant to supply ajustification
for each strike compromises the essence of the peremptory challenge
because litigants can no longer exercise it as an arbitrary right to re-
move a juror whom they instinctively distrust.186 Justice Scalia pre-
dicted that the criminal defendant will experience the most
significant backlash from this developing jurisprudence, as there is no
substitute for the peremptory challenge that would as effectively pro-
tect the defendant's right to a fairjury.' 87 Second, the entire judicial
system will sustain injury as it assumes the burden of the new collateral
litigation generated by a system in which each peremptory strike ap-
179 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Voir dire will not suffice as a replacement for the peremp-
tory challenge, Justice Scalia noted, because "the biases that go along with group character-
istics tend to be biases that the juror himself does not perceive, so that it is no use asking
about them." Id. at 1438-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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parently based on gender or race will be subject to a hearing to deter-
mine its true foundation. 88 Justice Scalia expects the criminal
defendant, in particular, to make full and costly use of such opportu-
nities, which could potentially arise in every trial once gender-based
claims have entered the mix.189 Third, expanding the Court's ruling
to what he called its "logical conclusion," Justice Scalia argued that
choosing a witness based on which gender the litigant believes will
have a greater impact on the jury or selecting a particular line of rea-
soning because it may evoke the female jurors' sympathy, will consti-
tute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 190
In his conclusion, Justice Scalia accused the Court of threatening
the peremptory challenge with extinction "not to eliminate any real
denial of equal protection, but simply to pay conspicuous obeisance to
the equality of the sexes."' 9 ' According to Justice Scalia, "[t] he Con-
stitution of the United States neither requires nor permits this vandal-
izing of our people's traditions."
192
V. ANALYSIS
The decision in JE.B. v. Alabama is not surprising in light of the
developments that have taken place in equal protection jurisprudence
in recent years. Prohibiting civil litigants from exercising gender-
based (more specifically, male-based) peremptory challenges appears
to be a logical and predictable outgrowth of the Court's prior deci-
sions. However, a great deal of controversy surrounds the practical
implications of placing further restrictions on the use of peremptory
challenges. The Court's decision in Batson sparked a firestorm of aca-
demic speculation about whether the Court would extend Equal Pro-
tection Clause analysis to peremptory challenges based on other
cognizable group characteristics and further, whether such an exten-
sion would signal the demise of the peremptory challenge as an in-
strument of securing a fair and impartial jury.193 While the decision
188 Id. at 1439 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
189 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19' Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193 See e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights andJuy Serice
61 U. CrN. L REv. 1139 (1992) (arguing that, in light of historical exclusion of women
from jury service, the Court should extend its decision in Batson to prohibit gender-based
peremptory challenges, but that complete elimination of peremptory challenges would be
ill-advised); Deborah L Forman, What Difference Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2
UCLA WomEN's L.J. 35 (1992) (endorsing system of proportional representation as alter-
native to prohibiting gender-based peremptory challenges because while extending Batson
to gender is justifiable in terms of law, such extension distorts arbitrary and capricious
nature of peremptory challenge); Thomas A. Hett, Batson v. Kentucky: Present Extensions
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in J.E.B. does not help to define the outer limits of equal protection
prohibitions, this Note argues that the Court has selected the correct
path toward eliminating invidious discrimination from the jury selec-
tion process.
A. THE COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
True to the predictions of Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bat-
son,'94 the Court has applied traditional equal protection analysis to
class-based peremptory challenges, and the challenges have not with-
stood the heightened scrutiny afforded to classifications based on gen-
der. Unlike Batson, which bypassed traditional equal protection
analysis and applied a strange hybrid analysis requiring the showing of
a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, 95 the Court in JE.B.
determined that the important state objective of securing a fair and
impartial jury could not be substantially advanced by removing jurors
of a particular gender from the venire.196
Although the State of Alabama reasoned that its important inter-
est in establishing the paternity of an illegitimate child justified the
exclusion ofjurors of one gender from the venire, the Court properly
relied upon Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.197 to establish that the
only purpose of peremptory challenges is to facilitate the selection of
a fair and impartial jury, not to secure a jury stacked in the state's
favor. Given either justification, however, no evidence indicates that
excluding men from the jury would substantially advance the state's
interest. While exclusion of men or women from the jury may eradi-
cate a small portion of biased jurors under specific and limited cir-
cumstances, 198 the application of the peremptory challenge to all
members of one gender group reflects a classification which is both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive for purposes of equal protection
analysis. The class of persons who will best effectuate the state's goal
cannot be precisely identified: not all women will be sympathetic to
the plight of a single mother; not all men will identify with a man who
and Future Applications, 24 Lov. U. CHI. LJ. 413 (1993) (predicting that Court would ex-
pand Batson rationale to prohibit gender-biased challenges but would not extend prohibi-
tion to peremptory challenges based on age or religion).
194 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123-24 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). "That
the Court is not applying conventional equal protection analysis is shown by its limitation
of its new rule to allegations of impermissible challenge on the basis of race .... But if
conventional equal protection principles apply, then presumably defendants could object
to exclusions on the basis of not only race, but also sex...." Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
195 Id. at 126 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
196 SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426-27 (1994).
197 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
198 In rape trials, for instance, female jurors tend to be slightly more conviction-prone
than male jurors. REID HAsTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 141-42 (1983).
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chooses not to become involved in his illegitimate child's life. There-
fore, it is not certain that the exercise of peremptory challenges to
exclude one gender advances the state's interest in achieving an unbi-
ased panel of jurors.
Although somewhat troublesome for the dissent, the fact that the
petitioner in this case was male and the excluded venirepersons were
also male was of no consequence to the disposition of the case. 199
The Court's lengthy discussion of the historic exclusion of women
from jury service added some unnecessary confusion to the majority's
equal protection analysis, for equal protection jurisprudence does not
require a showing that the victim of disparate treatment belongs to a
historically disadvantaged group. Although not elevated to the status
of a suspect classification, gender has been judicially recognized as a
classification which merits a heightened level of scrutiny to resolve dis-
putes over disparate treatment.200 The main issue in the case is
whether striking jurors of one gender reinforces harmful stereotypes
about the relative abilities of either gender to serve as impartial
jurors.
2 0 1
Because the peremptory challenges at issue in JE.B. were exer-
cised by the State of Alabama and not a private citizen, the question,
prevalent in many recent cases, of whether the restraints of the Equal
Protection Clause apply'to the litigant's use of jury selection mecha-
nisms, was not a factor in the Court's decision. Likewise, the often
related issue of third-party standing did not play an important role in
the disposition of this case because the defendant asserted his own
right to equal protection of the laws-jurors of the defendant's own
gender had been excluded from the jury leading to the presumption
that the defendant himself had suffered injury as a result of being
denied a fair and impartial jury. While in fact the verdict may not
199 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982). Concluding
that a statute that prohibited male students from enrolling in a nursing degree program at
a state university for women disadvantaged excluded males, the Court stated, "that this
statutory policy discriminates against males rather than against females does not exempt it
from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review." Id. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971) ("To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other... is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
200 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
201 Striking male jurors in a paternity case like J.E.B. may simultaneously reinforce un-
flattering stereotypes about both the excluded men and the women who remain on the
jury. For example, women may be perceived as weak and overly sympathetic to issues of
childrearing and family because the home is a woman's domain, whereas men may be




have differed if the state had not excluded men from the jury,20 2 the
Court reinforced its position by relying on precedent to establish that
both excluded jurors and society at large suffer from the discrimina-
tory exercise of peremptory challenges.2
03
B. ARE MALE AND FEMALE JURORS FUNGIBLE?
The Court based its decision injE.B on the failure of the state to
convincingly demonstrate that qualified male jurors are likely to exer-
cise biased judgment in favor of male defendants in paternity suits.
204
The Court rejected the argument that gender is predictive of juror
attitudes and implied that male and female jurors are interchangea-
ble.2 0 5 While studies generally fail to show any strong correlation be-
tween gender and juror bias in typical criminal cases,206 social-
psychological theories posit that men and women employ different
methods of moral decision making20 7 and different methods of recal-
ling and perceiving facts.208 The Court in Ballard v. United States ap-
peared to recognize these differences between the sexes, pointing out
that men and women are not fungible in terms of the experiences and
perspectives which they bring into the jury box.2 0 9 Each juror will be
impartial, but each one will bring his or her own wealth of experience
to the process and may perceive the facts in a different light.2 10 There
would be no need for the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section require-
ment ifjurors from every conceivable classification espoused the same
attitude about the case. Differences across group affiliations are ex-
pected, and, litigants should solicit divergent input to satisfy the fair
cross-section requirement.
202 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1436-37 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203 See id. at 1427-28. The Court invoked the reasoning set forth in Powers v. Ohio to
propound its argument that the state's participation in the exercise of discriminatory per-
emptory challenges undermines public confidence in the jury system and reinforces preju-
dicial group stereotypes regarding an individual's qualification to serve on a jury. Id. at
1427.
204 See id. at 1427.
205 See id.
206 HAS-IE Er AL., supra note 198 at 141-42. The study notes some modest differences in
female attitudes toward rape defendants indicating that women are more conviction-prone
under the specific circumstances of a rape trial. The authors also note that female jurors
may be more apt than male jurors to shift their votes from guilty to not guilty during the
course of deliberations. Id. Such a tendency may erase any effects of women's enhanced
propensity to prejudge a defendant's guilt. See Edmond onstantini et al., Gender andJuror
Partiality: Are Women More Likely to Prejudge Guilt?, 67JUDICATURE 121, 127 (1983).
207 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOcICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVEL-
OPMENT (1982).
208 Nancy S. Marder, Note, GenderDynamics andJuiy Deliberations, 96 YAi.E LJ. 593, 600-01
(1986).




Acknowledging an incongruity between the Court's Equal Protec-
tion and Sixth Amendment approaches to the issue of gender differ-
ences, one scholar recently remarked:
We seem to be faced with a paradox: the fair cross-section requirement
... recognizes women's difference, while Batson, De Gross, and equal pro-
tection analysis deny it. The challenge is how to accommodate the possi-
bility of difference without reinforcing it and without perpetuating
invidious stereotypes, while bearing in mind that the ultimate goal of
jury selection is to empanel an impartial jury.
211
The answer lies in the fact that while jurors' gender-related exper-
iences may ultimately influence their decisions, gender does not im-
pact upon an individual's ability to assess the facts and render an
impartial and unbiased decision. Gender differences manifest them-
selves in the manner in which jurors recall and characterize facts, in
their methods of discussing the case, and in their degree of participa-
tion in deliberations.2 12 Such differences arise because men and wo-
men typically occupy different places in society.213 The fact that men
and women experience the world differently does not mean that per-
sons of either gender will be unable to assess the facts of a particular
case without interjecting gender-specific attitudes about the out-
come-it merely means that men and women may arrive at their con-
clusions via different processes of analysis.
Extending beyond the limited scope of gender as a predictor of
juror verdicts, other studies show that although at times voir dire may
have a serious impact upon the outcome of a trial, by and large attor-
neys' intuitions about juror attitudes do not accurately detect bias in
jurors against whom they exercise peremptory challenges. 214 The
value of the peremptory challenge, then, lies not in its ability to accu-
rately identify and remove biased jurors from the venire, but rather in
its emotional impact on the litigants, in particular, criminal defend-
ants. Litigants' ability to influence the process that will determine
their fate is an important component in building confidence in the
fairness of the judicial system. While widespread confidence in the
jury system is important, the Court has recognized that the generation
and perpetuation of invidious stereotypes is too high a price to pay to
ensure such confidence.2 15 Furthermore, confidence in the fairness
211 Forman, supra note 193 at 54-55.
212 Marder, supra note 208 at 600-01.
213 Id. at 600.
214 Hans Zeisel & Shari Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Verdict: An
Experiment in a Federal District Cour 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 528 (1978); see also Solomon M.
Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, Attorney Jury Selection Folklore: What Do They Think and How Can
Psychologists Help?, 3 FoRENsic RE.Ps. 233, 246-47 (1990).
215 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
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and integrity of the jury selection process can be directly undermined
by state use and sanction of discriminatory peremptory challenges.21
6
C. J.E.B.'S LEGACY
1. Closing the Floodgates
Most critics of the Court's decisions in Batson and JE.B. express
grave concern that the peremptory challenge, a pragmatic and vener-
able institution, will perish at the hands of the Equal Protection
Clause.2 17 Recent developments, however, indicate that the Court
does not intend, at least for the present, to further extend its equal
protection analysis to peremptory challenges based on classifications
which are not as self-evident as race and gender.218 In refusing to
grant certiorari to a case in which an African-American man was pur-
portedly struck from the jury panel because of his religious affiliation,
the Court implicitly signified that Batson's equal protection analysis
does not apply to all peremptory challenges based on classifications
entitled to heightened scrutiny.
2 19
Furthermore, in J.E.B. the Court explicitly condoned the use of
peremptory challenges to remove groups or classes of individuals ordi-
narily subject to rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause and indicated that attorneys may base peremptory strikes on
characteristics that are commonly linked to one gender or the
other.220 In effect, litigants may continue to exercise peremptory
challenges on the basis of a wide array of group characteristics includ-
ing age, wealth, mental capacity, political ideology, education, occupa-
tion, and other factors besides race and gender that litigants
commonly predict will influence the jury deliberation process. Far
from meeting its demise, the peremptory challenge has merely exper-
ienced a diminution of its territory.
Critics of the Court's inclination toward restricting the scope of
peremptory challenges for the sake of eradicating reliance on and re-
inforcement of invidious stereotypes further advance the argument
that the judicial system will become overwhelmed with collateral litiga-
tion arising from allegations of discrimination in the exercise of per-
216 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1991).
217 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123-24 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); See also
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
218 See Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), cert. denied.
219 Id. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Bewildered by the Court's denial of certiorari
on the issue of religious-based peremptory challenges, Justice Thomas, joined in his dis-
senting opinion by Justice Scalia, stated, "I can only conclude that the Court's decision to
deny certiorari stems from an unwillingness to confront forthrightly the ramifications of
the decision in J.E.B." Id. at 2122.
220 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994).
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emptory challenges.221 They posit that if gender-based peremptory
challenges were prohibited, every challenge exercised would become
inherently suspect and subject to demands for alternative explana-
tions.2 22 History, however, does not support such theories: After Bat-
son, the courts were not inundated with claims that peremptory
challenges were made on racial grounds.223 Furthermore, parties al-
leging the discrimination must make out a prima facie case that their
opponents intentionally discriminated againstjurors of one gender.22 4
Only then is the litigant required to provide agender-neutral explana-
tion for the strike, an explanation which need not rise to the level of a
challenge for cause.223 Since the Court enunciated the primafacie re-
quirement in Batson, lower courts have disagreed about the type of
circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. 22 6
While some courts hold that a litigant establishes a prima facie case if
only one juror of a minority race is removed from the jury panel,
many other courts require that a litigant demonstrate a pattern of
striking jurors of one racial classification.22 7 Demographic realities
dictate that in most jury pools, jurors of one particular gender will
greatly outnumber minority jurors, and, therefore, courts will proba-
bly exhibit greater hesitation in finding a prima fade case of gender
discrimination unless a litigant strikes a significant number of jurors
of one sex from the jury panel.
2 2 8
While the decision inJE.B rendered the exercise of peremptory
challenges somewhat less capricious and arbitrary, the right of liti-
gants to remove jurors whom they find distasteful is not a constitution-
ally guaranteed right, and therefore, the equal protection concerns
must take precedence over concerns about altering the nature of a
time-honored tradition. Because no serious floodgate threat exists,
there is no need to compromise the fundamental liberties that the
Constitution guarantees.
221 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
222 See State v. Oliviera, 534"A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987) (holding that reas6ning in Batson
does not extend to gender-based discrimination, because in Batson the Court limited its
discussion to discrimination based on race); see alsoJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1439
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("While demographic reality places some limit on the
number of cases in which race-based challenges will be an issue, every case contains a
potential sex-based claim.").
223 Marko, supra note 19, at 127.
2 24 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429-30 (1994).
225 Id.
226 Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Juy Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson V.
Kentucky, 25 WiLAmrrE L. Ray. 293, 309-16 (1989).
227 Id.
228 See Forman, supra note 193 at 58.
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2. Precluding the Use of Gender as a Proxy for Racism
The Court's holding in J.E.B. ensures that litigants cannot use
gender as a race-neutral explanation for challenging a member of a
cognizable racial group.2 29 In the absence of a decision prohibiting
the exercise of gender-based peremptory challenges, the majority
speculated that the principles of Batson would be undermined by at-
torneys using gender-based eliminations as proxies for racial exclu-
sion, thereby obscuring racial discrimination from judicial scrutiny.
23 0
While this prediction at first blush seems implausible, the Fourth Cir-
cuit encountered just such a scenario in the pre-J.E.B. case Hamilton v.
United States.2 31 In Hamilton, the court affirmed as constitutional the
removal of three African-American jurors who were allegedly stricken
because of their gender, not their race.2 32 The prosecution's attempt
to provide a race-neutral explanation for the strikes, although ac-
cepted by the court, was "completely wanting in rationality or validity
because only black women were stricken while no white women
were."
2 3 3
Although most litigants will scrupulously adhere to the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution and avoid challenging jurors on an
invidiously discriminatory basis,234 undoubtedly some litigants will
continue to concoct neutral explanations to mask intentional racial
and gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
The Court's decision in J.E.B., however, will reduce the ammunition
available to would-be challengers. Furthermore, by removing gender
and race as acceptable explanations for striking potential jurors, the
Court forces litigants to use neutral justifications which, regardless of
their true intent, will not reinforce invidious group stereotypes or cre-
ate a presumption that particular individuals are unqualified for jury
service based on a cognizable characteristic.
While requiring litigants to articulate race- and gender-neutral
explanations for removing particular jurors from the venire detracts
from the arbitrary nature of the peremptory challenge, the require-
ment is not unduly burdensome, because any attorney "can easily as-
sert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror . -*"235 Problems
arise, however, when a court must determine whether the proffered
229 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
230 Id.
231 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988).
232 See id. at 1041-42.
233 Id. at 1043 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
234 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 644 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
235 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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explanation for striking a juror is a legitimate reason or a pretextual
reason, because "trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess those
reasons."236 Admittedly, prohibiting gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges is no panacea for eliminating invidious discrimination from the
jury selection process. However, it is more preferable to forbid the
use of such challenges and periodically uphold a discriminatory strike
masked by a neutral explanation, than to allow discriminatory gender-
based strikes to consistently stand unchallenged.
3. Impact on the Criminal Defendant
In his dissenting opinion in JE.B., Justice Scalia stated that "the
loss of the real peremptory will be felt most keenly by the criminal
defendant," because there is no substitute for the peremptory chal-
lenge.2 37 The peremptory strike, however, has not yet disappeared
from the jury selection process, and litigants still have the ability to
remove for cause those jurors who manifest blatant biases on either
side of the spectrum through the voir dire process. Although by its
nature the challenge for cause procedure is more cumbersome and
time-consuming than the exercise of peremptory challenges, it consti-
tutionally eliminates jury bias without reliance upon group stereotypes
regarding a juror's ability to serve as an impartial trier of fact.
Criminal defendants may make use of voir dire to question poten-
tial jurors and discover actual bias. Although the courts generally will
not excuse jurors for cause if they assert that they will cast away their
preconceived opinions about the case and render an impartial verdict
based on the facts presented in evidence,238 they will excuse those ju-
rors whose opinions raise a manifest presumption of partiality, rather
than merely represent a hypothetical judgment.23 9 Even if the litigant
fails in dismissing a tainted juror for cause, the litigant may exercise a
peremptory challenge against that juror on the basis of a number of
benign characteristics that the Court sanctions. Jurors suspected of
harboring bias will be stricken on the basis of their own statements
made during voir dire, not because the gender or color of the juror's
skin stereotypically suggests that the juror will not be impartial. For
that reason it should not be burdensome for the challenger to provide
a gender- and race-neutral explanation for the juror's removal. There
is no real need, therefore, to base peremptory challenges on stere-
otypical notions about gender and race.
Although not a direct issue in the resolution of JE.B., the ques-
236 Id.
2 37 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1438 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
239 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878).
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tion of who qualifies as a state actor for purposes of equal protection
analysis occupied a dominant position in Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence. She advocates, in spite of Court precedent to the contrary,240
that equal protection prohibitions should apply only to the govern-
ment's use of peremptory challenges, and not to the exercise of chal-
lenges by private civil litigants or criminal defendants.24' While
intuitively it makes sense that private litigants and criminal defendants
are not "state actors," courts have offered logical justifications for mak-
ing such classifications. 242 Furthermore, it would be unfair to society
to place restrictions on only the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges. Although the distinction is designed to safeguard the in-
terest of private litigants in securing a fair and impartial jury for them-
selves, state prosecutors presumably act on behalf of society at large in
criminal proceedings and, therefore, have an equally important inter-
est in selecting a jury that will render an unbiased decision based
upon the facts of the case.2 43
By way of illustration, one commentator recently suggested that
abolishing the government's right to exercise peremptory strikes
would be a fair solution to the problem of bigotry injury selection.244
The author stated that criminal defendants must retain their right to
exercise peremptory challenges because "[i] t would be intolerable for
an African-American or a Jewish defendant to be prohibited from
striking a potential juror who is editor of 'White Power' magazine."245
It would be an intolerable detriment to society, however, for a prose-
cutor to be prohibited from striking that same juror in the trial of a
white man accused of committing a hate crime.
It is counter-intuitive to assume that curtailing a prosecutor's ex-
ercise of peremptory challenges while simultaneously allowing crimi-
nal defendants and private civil litigants to discriminate at random,
will accomplish any sort of justice. Discrimination within a govern-
240 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); see aso Georgia v. Mc-
Collum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
241 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
242 See United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1992). Citing Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the Ninth Circuit recognized that litigants
cannot exercise peremptory challenges without significant aid from the government and
that the jury is a governmental body whose purpose it is to carry out a government func-
tion. The court noted that although the government delegates a portion of its jury selec-
tion power to private litigants, the power nonetheless retains its governmental nature and
its exercise is supervised and controlled by the court. Furthermore, the fact thatjury selec-
tion takes place in a courthouse, which symbolizes government authority, gives the appear-
ance that the process is government-sanctioned.
243 See id. at 1436-37.




ment forum will continue to occur under Justice O'Connor's
scheme-the only difference is that it will be one-sided. Exclusion of
jurors based on group stereotypes is no less damaging to the excluded
juror if accomplished at the hands of a private citizen participating in
a government-sponsored process rather than at the hands of the gov-
ernment prosecutor.246 Uneven distribution of the power to elimi-
nate jurors from the venire would lead to unjust results.
VI. CONCLUSION
In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the exercise of gender-based peremptory
strikes. The opinion is a well-reasoned extension of the Batson v. Ken-
tucky line of cases which previously prohibited the use of race-based
peremptory challenges.
This decision has not sounded the death knell for the peremp-
tory challenge as many jurists predicted it would. Instead, J.E.B.
placed one reasonable restriction upon the use of peremptories, while
leaving unblemished a litigant's right to challenge jurors bearing
characteristics of other heightened scrutiny classifications such as reli-
gious affiliation. Additionally, the Court has preserved the entire field
of rational basis classifications as legitimate grounds for the exclusion
ofjurors. Rather than detracting from the jury selection process, the
decision enhances the fairness of the entire judicial system by enforc-
ing fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States and guaranteeing to all citizens an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in the administration of justice.
BETH A. DEVERMAN
246 Georgia v. McColIum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353 (1992).
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